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I. INTRODUCTION
Mixed reality and augmented reality (AR) are the way of the future. By 
2020, the mixed and augmented reality industry is expected to be valued at $162 
billion.1 With the rise of wearable devices with AR capabilities2 and the 
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1 The Virtual and Augmented Reality Market Will Reach $162 Billion by 2020, BUS.
INSIDER (Aug. 22, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/virtual-and-augmented-reality-
markets-will-reach-162-billion-by-2020-2016-8 [https://perma.cc/HMC5-Z9Q9] (“The 
adoption of AR and VR headsets will be driven primarily by the introduction of less 
expensive models to the market . . . creating new use cases in entertainment, workplaces, and 
education.”) [hereinafter Virtual, BUS. INSIDER].
2 Paul Lamkin, The Best Augmented Reality Glasses 2018: Snap, Vuzix, ODG, Sony & 
More, WAREABLE (July 3, 2018), https://www.wareable.com/ar/the-best-smartglasses-
google-glass-and-the-rest [https://perma.cc/4BRT-PAUU].
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inclusion of AR features in new software such as iOS 12,3 mixed reality and 
augmented reality are sure to become more mainstream in American life. 
Patrons can enter into real-world venues and put on a pair of glasses that 
supplement their experiences by providing digital data and virtual displays of 
information.4 Applications such as Pokémon Go5 have brought AR to the 
mainstream and spurred the development of thousands of new applications.6
Additionally, most new smartphones and wearable devices have the ability to 
superimpose intellectual property, such as trademarked logos and identifiers,
over real-world property on the device’s screen.7
The advanced technology behind AR places it in a unique position to have 
unforeseen effects on three distinct areas of the law: traditional property law, 
trademark law, and copyright law. As such, various questions are being raised 
about the viability of the current laws within each field.8 First, are developers 
                                                                                                                     
3 Stefan Etienne, Apple Announces iOS 12 with New AR Features, Photos
Improvements, and More, THE VERGE (June 4, 2018), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/6/4/17414386/ios-12-announced-features-release-date-
apple-wwdc-2018 [https://perma.cc/SJ5A-R4BD].
4 See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Mixed Reality: How the Laws of Virtual Worlds Govern 
Everyday Life, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 55, 56–57 (2012) (discussing the use of smartphones 
to overlay digital content onto real spaces that effectively connects the content to a real space, 
creating augmented reality—for example, a museum patron who points his or her 
smartphone at a sculpture, and the artist appears on the screen ready to be interviewed); see 
also Jennifer Billock, Five Augmented Reality Experiences that Bring Museum Exhibits to 
Life, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (June 29, 2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/travel/expanding-
exhibits-augmented-reality-180963810/ [https://perma.cc/GJG9-T6JA] (describing 
Smithsonian’s oldest museum hall, The Bone Hall, which now allows guests to use an app 
to overlay skin and movements onto the bones on display, bringing exhibits to life).
5 The details of how Pokémon Go works will be discussed further in this Note.
Pokémon Go has achieved enormous commercial success. As of December 5, 2017, the 
application had been downloaded over 100 million times and generated total revenue of $268 
million. Artyom Dogtiev, Pokémon Go Revenue and Usage Statistics, BUS. APPS (Dec. 5, 
2017), http://www.businessofapps.com/data/pokemon-go-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/5NFX
-4PHA].
6 Jefferson Graham, Get Ready for Thousands of Augmented Reality Apple Apps, USA
TODAY (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/talkingtech/2017/09/06/get-ready
-thousands-augmented-reality-apple-apps/630957001/ [https://perma.cc/R7EB-TMB6]
(“Apple has thousands of apps—some say as many as 10,000—ready to unleash in just a few 
weeks.”). 
7 See Etienne, supra note 3; ARKit – What’s New in ARKit 1.5, APPLE.INC,
https://developer.apple.com/arkit/ [https://perma.cc/9UTR-8NGK] (allowing for developers 
to incorporate augmented reality features into new or existing applications).
8 See Jamison Gilmore, Augmented Reality Incitement: How the Creator of Pokémon 
Go, and Those Who Follow, Are Open to Tortious Liability, 47 SW. L. REV. 231, 231–34
(2017) (discussing the potential liability issues stemming from augmented reality 
applications, such as Pokémon Go); Shannon Yavorsky & Kimberly Culp, Are You Prepared 
for the Legal Issues of Augmented Reality?, LEXOLOGY (July 16, 2017), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=48f0efb9-a22b-46c5-ad53-a0077e69e67a
[https://perma.cc/D8ZF-RNKK] (discussing the ability of augmented reality to blur the lines 
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responsible for real-world property damages that occur when players use their 
AR applications, or are developers insulated from liability through First 
Amendment or other protections? Second, are AR applications that use visual 
trademarks to trigger the display of other, competing trademarks protected under 
the fair use doctrine9 or parody protections,10 or are they not protectable under 
the current Lanham Act at all? Finally, does copyright law adequately protect 
hybrid works created by AR where new intellectual property is overlaid on top 
of existing copyrighted works?
Intended to serve as a lawmaker’s guide for protection of property rights, 
this Note will identify the most significant issue for each of these three areas of 
the law and suggest a framework for a modest legislative proposal in each Part
designed to prevent the laws from becoming outdated within the next ten 
years.11 In Part II, this Note provides background information about mixed and 
augmented reality technologies, detailing the technology itself and issues that 
are certain to arise as AR advances further and further beyond what the current
legal framework originally contemplated. In Part III, this Note examines real-
world property laws and advocates for Congressional action to create a catchall 
real and intellectual property law (Virtual Invasion of Physical Land) that 
includes an opt-in and opt-out provision for landowners. After proposing a 
                                                                                                                     
between reality and computer-generated information); Legal Issues with Augmented Reality,
PILLSBURY LAW, https://www.socialgameslaw.com/files/2014/11/Legal-Issues-with-Aug
mented-Reality.pdf [https://perma.cc/PL72-X6GK] (discussing the effects of augmented 
reality on copyright and trademark law); Eugene Volokh, Law, Virtual Reality, and 
Augmented Reality, WASH. POST (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/03/17/law-virtual-reality-and-augmented-reality/?utm_term=.2
5ee5b6c0a4 [https://perma.cc/VNM8-A4N9] (discussing the legal issues that AR presents to 
courts, companies, and users).
9 Defendants in a trademark infringement dilution claim can assert two types of 
affirmative defenses, one of which is fair use. See Part V.C infra. Fair use occurs when a 
descriptive mark is used in good faith and no consumer confusion results. See Part V.C infra.
Numerous cases have examined the fair use defense. See Part V.C infra. Nominative fair use 
is another available defense that can be raised when a defendant uses a registered mark or 
term if it is necessary for purposes of identifying another producer’s product. Overview of 
Trademark Law, HARVARD ONLINE, https://cyber.harvard.edu/metaschool/fisher/domain/t
m.htm [https://perma.cc/H7BZ-9ULF] [hereinafter Trademark Overview]; see also Lanham 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012) (application for registration of a trademark).
10 The parody defense may be raised when a usage of a particular mark is not tied to
commercial use per se, but it is used in an artistic or editorial way. See Trademark Overview,
supra note 9.
11 This Note will examine three areas of the law in three separate Parts and provide 
three legislative proposals. These proposals all share the common goal of updating the 
relevant laws in order to deal with the age of augmented and mixed reality. The proposals in 
this Note are meant to serve as a general framework that identifies the biggest issue for each 
area of the law and the steps needed to resolve the issue. The legislative proposals in this 
Note could, in theory, be passed by Congress as one comprehensive package, such as an 
“Augmented and Mixed Reality Property Protections for the 21st Century” bill. 
Alternatively, the proposals could be passed as separate pieces of legislation. For clarity, the 
proposed text is split amongst three different Parts within this Note.
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solution for real property disputes, this Note transitions to the protection of 
intellectual property. In Part IV, this Note examines trademark law and 
advocates for revision of the Lanham Act to prevent AR applications from using 
visual trademarks to mislead or misdirect consumers. Finally, Part V examines 
copyright law and advocates for adopting an amendment to the Copyright Act 
to incorporate AR technologies and define the limits of derivative works and 
fair use. Part VI of this Note offers a brief conclusion. 
II. THE RAPID RISE OF AN AUGMENTED AND MIXED REALITY WORLD
Augmented reality, sometimes referred to as “mixed reality,”12 involves the 
mixing of “virtual” and “actual” reality using specially designed software.13 AR 
has been around in some form since 1968.14 Harvard computer scientist Ivan 
Sutherland created the first AR device, a head-mounted display system that 
superimposed virtual information on the physical environment.15 Early AR 
devices were used primarily for aviation and military purposes;16 however, for 
the ordinary consumer AR is a relatively new phenomenon.17 The first 
commercially available AR application appeared in 2008, allowing for users to 
view a car in a magazine ad as a 3D model on their computer.18 Today, AR 
applications are becoming more and more commonplace.19 For example, 
Snapchat recently released a desktop app, Lens Studio, that allows any user to 
create AR graphics for usage in the Snapchat mobile app.20 Additionally, Apple 
and Google recently released ARkit2 and ARCore, respectively, allowing 
                                                                                                                     
12 “Mixed reality” and “augmented reality” are used interchangeably in this Note. 
13 Fairfield, supra note 4, at 63.
14 Ana Javornik, The Mainstreaming of Augmented Reality: A Brief History, HARVARD
BUS. REVIEW (Oct. 4, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/10/the-mainstreaming-of-augmented-
reality-a-brief-history [https://perma.cc/7U8G-EWNE].
15 Id.; Ivar Kjellmo, 3D Design for Augmented Reality, in VIRTUAL, AUGMENTED AND 
MIXED REALITY: DESIGNING AND DEVELOPING AUGMENTED AND VIRTUAL 
ENVIRONMENTS 159, 160 (Randall Shumaker et al. eds., 2013).
16 Javornik, supra note 14.
17 See Virtual, BUS. INSIDER, supra note 1.
18 Javornik, supra note 14 (discussing the first commercial augmented reality 
application created by BMW that allowed for users to view a digital car overlaid on top of a 
physical magazine when they pointed their phone at the magazine, which allowed users to 
have a 3D model of the car they could rotate on their phones).
19 Graham, supra note 6.
20 The Snapchat Lens Studio allows for any user to create AR content that can be 
digitally overlaid within the Snapchat application. When the user holds down the screen on 
a particular object, the application will then place the AR element on top of that object on 
the device’s screen. This gives the effect that the digital object is actually part of the real-
world landscape. See Introducing Lens Studio, SNAP INC. (Dec. 14, 2017), 
https://www.snap.com/en-US/news/post/introducing-lens-studio/ [https://perma.cc/5XST-
BB62].
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developers to add AR experiences to their applications,21 while iOS 12 brings 
AR features to Apple devices worldwide.22
In fundamental terms, AR takes the real-world environment and “augments”
or adds to it with extra layers of digital information.23 Typically, AR 
applications use one of three methods for the superimposition of images on top 
of the physical world.24 Simultaneous Localization and Mapping (SLAM) 
allows for devices to map the real world around them using sensors and various 
algorithms.25 The combination allows the device to render virtual images on a 
handheld device’s screen over real-world objects.26 Recognition-based AR uses 
a camera to identify visual markers or objects, which triggers the application to 
display a particular image.27 The visual object displayed on the screen moves as 
the user rotates the camera.28 Lastly, location-based AR relies on GPS, compass, 
velocity, and accelerometer data about a user’s location or movements to display 
a particular object on the screen on top of the real-world landscape when a 
particular location is reached.29 Location-based AR is used by the popular 
application Pokémon Go.30
On November 16th, 2016, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, 
and Transportation held a hearing titled “Exploring Augmented Reality.”31 At 
the hearing, those in the mixed-reality space spoke about the implications of this 
                                                                                                                     
21 Both of these desktop applications allow the developer to include AR elements in 
any application for Android or IOS. Apple Unveils ARKit 2, APPLE (June 4, 2018),
https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2018/06/apple-unveils-arkit-2/ [https://perma.cc/9QED-
694D]; AR Core Overview, GOOGLE (Aug. 12, 2018), https://developers.google.com/ar/disc
over/ [https://perma.cc/2AUH-D7YW].
22 Etienne, supra note 3 (“Augmented reality, ARKit 2, sharing, and Shortcuts are some 
of the breakout features of iOS 12.”).
23 Augmented Reality, MACMILLAN DICTIONARY, https://www.macmillandictionary.co
m/us/buzzword/entries/augmented-reality.html [https://perma.cc/QR7V-9HDP].
24 The Ultimate Guide to Augmented Reality (AR) Technology, REALITY TECH., 
http://www.realitytechnologies.com/augmented-reality [https://perma.cc/Q9W3-UY3B] 
[hereinafter Ultimate Guide].
25 See Mojtaba Tabatabaie, How SLAM Technology is Redrawing Augmented Reality’s
Battle Lines, VENTUREBEAT (July 31, 2017), https://venturebeat.com/2017/07/31/how-slam-
technology-is-redrawing-augmented-realitys-battle-lines/ [https://perma.cc/QSB2-YRXG].




30 See Claire Warner, How Does “Pokémon Go” Work? Here’s Everything We Know 
About the Tech Behind the Augmented Reality Fad, BUSTLE (July 13, 2016), 
https://www.bustle.com/articles/172317-how-does-pokemon-go-work-heres-everything-
we-know-about-the-tech-behind-the-augmented-reality [https://perma.cc/DJ4N-UYQG] 
(describing the location-based technology behind Pokémon Go).
31 Exploring Augmented Reality, Before the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp., 114th 
Cong. 2–43 (2016) (statement of Brian Blau, Research Vice President, Gartner and John 
Hanke, CEO, Niantic).
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rapidly advancing field.32 Brian Blau, Research Vice President at Gartner, said
that he believed hundreds of millions of AR devices would be in the hands of 
consumers within the next five years.33 Additionally, others, such as John 
Hanke, CEO of Niantic,34 spoke about the need for regulations that do not stifle 
innovation in the AR space.35
While the technology has become increasingly popular over the past five
years and shows no signs of slowing, this rapid rise also converges with a space 
that has relatively little regulation and did not exist when the current body of 
law was drafted.36 Thus, the current body of regulation is generally judge-made
law,37 which is volatile and not sustainable in the current rapid technology 
boom. Legislators have recognized this fact as well.38 In May 2017, House 
members formed a “reality caucus” to consider issues related to virtual, 
augmented, and mixed realities.39
Evidenced by the rapid increase and advancement of commercially 
available AR applications since 2008, these technologies are only on the cusp 
of their full potential.40 However, almost all existing property, trademark, and 
copyright laws were enacted before augmented and mixed reality technologies 
were thought to be feasible for everyday consumer usage. Keeping this in mind, 
the remaining Parts of this Note take an in-depth look into the legal issues that 
are likely to arise as these technologies become more advanced and 
commonplace.
III. AUGMENTED REALITY AND REAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
AR applications are raising property disputes due to the uncharted legal area 
where the bounds of real and intellectual property meet. While there have been 
over thirteen million ARKit-created application downloads since the release of 
iOS11 in 2017,41 this Part will frequently refer to Pokémon Go as the primary 
example, as it has gained the most prominence, and consequentially, the most 
                                                                                                                     
32 Id.
33 Id. (“We forecast that in 5 to 10 years there will be hundreds of millions of HMD 
devices in the hands of users; split between see-through transparent display devices and those 
that provide full immersion, such as VR. There are many technology vendors competing for 
this opportunity, Microsoft, Google, ODG, Epson, DAQRI and many others.”).
34 Niantic created the application Pokémon Go. Id.
35 Id.
36 Yavorsky & Culp, supra note 8.
37 Farifield, supra note 4, at 59.
38 Yavorsky & Culp, supra note 8.
39 Id.
40 Sarah Perez, ARKit-Only Apps Top 13 Million Installs, Nearly Half from Games,
TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/03/28/arkit-only-apps-top-13-
million-installs-nearly-half-are-games/ [https://perma.cc/HNZ4-AHJZ].
41 Id.
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legal attention.42 Pokémon Go and other related AR applications use location-
based services that require players to travel to different predetermined real-
world locations in order to collect virtual items that contribute to gameplay.43
For example, in Pokémon Go, the “trainers” or players travel to different real-
world locations, the “Pokéstops,” in order to collect virtual Pokémon.44 Niantic, 
the developer of the game, sets the geographic coordinates of the “Pokéstops”
near or on real-world property.45
While many business owners have enjoyed economic benefits from the 
applications,46 the game’s requirement that players travel to real-world locations 
has also raised legal issues. For example, gamers have been found trespassing 
on private property,47 have been accused of damaging public and private 
property,48 have engaged in assault and battery of other players,49 and have cost 
cities large sums of money in order to protect public parks and provide extra law 
enforcement personnel.50
A. Attempts to Regulate Augmented Reality Applications
In response to the real-world damage caused by the AR application’s
players, some cities have attempted to implement local ordinances to deal with 
                                                                                                                     
42 Scott Stein, Pokémon Go Changed the Way People Look at Their Phones Forever,
CNET (July 7, 2017), https://www.cnet.com/news/for-better-or-worse-pokemon-go-is-ars-
signature-killer-app/ [https://perma.cc/2TPT-D8CB]; Nick Wingfield & Mike Isaac, 
Pokémon Go Brings Augmented Reality to a Mass Audience, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/12/technology/pokemon-go-brings-augmented-reality-
to-a-mass-audience.html?_r=0 [on file with Ohio State Law Journal]; Debra Cassens Weiss, 
Pokémon Go Spurs Lawyers to Stop and Consider Legal Issues, A.B.A. J. (July 13, 2016), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/pokemongospurslawyerstostopandconsider/ 
[https://perma.cc/GA2X-2DHC]. 
43 See Warner, supra note 30 (discussing the technology behind Pokémon Go).
44 Id. (“Pokémon Go uses your phone’s camera to place an image of a Pokémon within 
your surroundings, and the GPS, accelerometer, and compass give the game an idea of which 
direction your phone is pointing toward.”).
45 Id.
46 See Wingfield & Isaac, supra note 42 (detailing several businesses offering 
promotions for customers using the Pokémon Go app).
47 Pokémon Go Players Are Trespassing, Risking Arrest or Worse, DENV. POST (July 
12, 2016), https://www.denverpost.com/2016/07/13/pokemon-go-players-risking-arrest-
trespassing/ [https://perma.cc/BGZ6-WMTF].
48 Lauren Kravets, Man Says Pokémon Go Players Damaged His Property, KXAN 
(July 14, 2016), http://kxan.com/2016/07/14/neighbor-pokemon-go-hunters-damaged-
property/ [https://perma.cc/HS59-FKH3].
49 Sara Humphrey, Police: Players Fight over Pokémon Go in Downtown Sherman,
KXII (July 27, 2016), http://www.kxii.com/content/news/Pokemon-Go-causes-fist-fight-in-
Sherman-388485672.html [https://perma.cc/K82M-98X3].
50 Cox Media Group National Content Desk, Pokémon Go Player Tased, Arrested After 
Refusing to Leave Park, WHIOTV (July 23, 2016), http://www.whio.com/news/national/
pokemon-player-tased-arrested-after-refusing-leave-park/6ZrjZxXaxtfqyG3aaMvyjJ/ 
[https://perma.cc/8WQR-QSRN].
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the negative effects.51 For example in Candy Lab v. Milwauke Cty., the 
developer of an AR application called “Texas Rope ‘Em” challenged a 
Milwaukee County ordinance which required the developers of any AR 
application to obtain a permit before operating in Milwaukee.52 The ordinance53
was in response to the negative effects of the Pokémon Go application, such as: 
inadequate bathrooms for park-goers, unauthorized vendors in the park, parking 
violations, and significantly increased traffic congestion.54 One member of the 
Board that passed the ordinance claimed that the County was forced to foot the 
bill for “tens of thousands” of dollars to keep up with the additional park traffic 
because of the app.55
However, even with the increased costs to the county, the court in Candy 
Lab found that the First Amendment considerations outweighed the need for the 
ordinance.56 The Candy Lab court determined that AR applications are entitled 
to the same First Amendment protections as regular video games.57 The 
location-based nature of these applications, the court concluded, does not 
change the fact that the content itself cannot be regulated.58 Engaging in a First 
Amendment analysis, the court further stated that the ordinance requiring 
permits was an invalid restriction on speech because it treated AR applications 
as a separate category, distinguishing the games by their mode or channel of 
speech rather than their content.59
In addition to the public park at issue in Candy Lab, private homeowners in 
numerous states filed a class action lawsuit against Niantic, accusing the 
                                                                                                                     
51 Kyle Melnick, Milwaukee Is Being Sued over Mandatory Augmented Reality 
Permits, VR SCOUT (May 5, 2017), https://vrscout.com/news/milwaukee-sued-mandatory-
augmented-reality-permits/ [https://perma.cc/9F5D-4CJP].
52 Candy Lab Inc. v. Milwaukee Cty., 266 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1141 (E.D. Wis. 2017).
53 The ordinance read in pertinent part as follows: 
Virtual and location-based augmented reality games are not permitted in Milwaukee 
County Parks except in those areas designated with a permit for such use by the Director 
of the Department of Parks, Recreation, and Culture [ (the “DPRC”) ]. Permits shall be 
required before any company may introduce a location-based augmented reality game 
into the Parks, effective January 1, 2017.
Id. at 1143. 
54 Id. at 1142–43.
55 Id. at 1143.
56 Id. at 1151–52.
57 Id. at 1146–47 (“The Supreme Court has instructed that video games, like other forms 
of expression, are entitled to First Amendment protection. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 
564 U.S. 786, 790, 131 S.Ct. 2729, 180 L.Ed.2d 708 (2011). . . . Accordingly, the Court 
concludes that Texas Rope ‘Em qualifies for First Amendment protection and that the 
County’s motion to dismiss on that ground must be denied.”).
58 Candy Lab Inc. v. Milwaukee Cty., 266 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1149 (E.D. Wis. July 20, 
2017).
59 Id.
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company of encouraging trespassing and nuisance.60 In a complaint filed in the 
Northern District of California, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant (Niantic) 
had designated Pokéstops and Pokémon Gyms on or directly adjacent to private 
property without the consent of the property owners.61 The homeowners further 
alleged that the players had been congregating in front of their property.62 As 
such, the homeowners brought claims of unjust enrichment and nuisance.63
Recently, it was announced that the two parties had reached a settlement.64 Part 
of the settlement agreement required Niantic to set up a web portal that would 
allow homeowners to complain about virtual Pokéstops and Gyms being too 
close to their property.65 While this solution certainly helps homeowners 
affected by Pokémon Go, it is little help when these issues arise in relation to 
similar location based applications.
The underlying question in these cases is whose rights dominate when 
someone’s intellectual property is overlaid on top of real-world property.66 Can 
a real-world owner or municipality force a developer, such as Niantic, to remove 
its intellectual property from a geographic location under the existing common 
law trespass or nuisance laws? Can developers, such as Niantic, be held liable 
for “virtual trespassing”67 under current common law? Examining these issues 
under current property and tort law principles demonstrates the need for an 
                                                                                                                     
60 Joseph Ax, Pokémon No-Go: New Jersey Resident Sues over Trespassing Players,
REUTERS (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nintendo-pokemon-lawsuit/
pokemon-no-go-new-jersey-resident-sues-over-trespassing-players-idUSKCN10E29Z
[https://perma.cc/252Y-JPJK]; Pokémon Go Makers Face Trespassing Lawsuit, BBC NEWS
(Aug. 3, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-36961201 [https://perma.cc/LC69-
3SPX]; Paul Tassin, Pokémon Go Maker Seeks Dismissal of Trespass, Nuisance Class 
Action, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Feb. 1, 2017), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-
settlements/lawsuit-news/460893-pokemon-go-maker-seek-dismissal-trespass-nuisance-
class-action/ [https://perma.cc/GW8L-RMCZ].
61 Complaint at ¶ 5, Marder v. Niantic, 4:16-cv-04300-KAW (N.D. CA 2016).
62 Id. at ¶ 6.
63 Id. at 13–14.
64 Kyle Orland, Niantic Poised to Settle Pokémon Go Trespassing Complaints, ARS
TECHNICA (Feb. 18, 2019), https://arstechnica.com/gaming/2019/02/niantic-poised-to-
settle-pokemon-go-trespassing-complaints/ [https://perma.cc/2H2V-EYJQ].
65 Id.
66 While the Candy Labs court was concerned with a public park, the underlying 
nuisance question remains for private landowners as well. For example, if Niantic places a 
virtual Pokémon outside of someone’s home, the players often congregate in front of the 
homeowner’s property on the street, which is still technically public land. Additionally, the 
underlying dispute in all of these cases will be whether placing intellectual property within 
the bounds of another’s GPS coordinates can be subject to liability.
67 Michael Joe Murphy, Pokémon Go Hotspots: ‘Virtual Trespassing’ in Real-World 
Lawsuit, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Apr. 12, 2017), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/opinion/os-
ed-pokemon-go-are-you-a-tresspasser-lawsuit-interview-20170412-story.html
[https://perma.cc/MYJ8-F5FR] (discussing the idea of “virtual trespass” as a law that would 
cover virtual intrusions of land in addition to physical ones).
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updated catchall provision that will handle trespass, nuisance, and other claims 
caused by virtual property being overlaid on real-world property.68
B. Inadequacy of Current Property Laws
An individual can be held liable for trespass on private property if that 
individual intentionally enters land in possession of another, causes a third 
person to do so, remains on the land, or fails to remove from the land a thing 
which he or she is under a duty to remove.69 Examining the comments and 
illustrations to the Restatement, however, there is no mention of anything but 
“physical objects.”70 Additionally, the Supreme Court has hinted that for 
trespass to stand, a “physical-world invasion is required.”71 Real-world property
owners could argue that AR application developers cause entry of a third person 
onto the land.72 The actor is liable for trespass if he or she has commanded or 
requested a third person to enter land in the possession of another; the actor is 
responsible for the third person’s entry if it is a trespass.73 However, developers,
such as Niantic, include provisions in their standard form agreement, 
exculpating them from liability for these particular instances.74 In this instance, 
                                                                                                                     
68 The above examples demonstrate how different AR is from what has been previously 
contemplated by property laws. Developers of an AR application have the ability to place 
their intellectual property on thousands of owned properties at one time in different states 
across the country. See Fairfield, supra note 4, at 56–57.
69 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“One is subject to 
liability to another for trespass, irrespective of whether he thereby causes harm to any legally 
protected interest of the other, if he intentionally (a) enters land in the possession of the other, 
or causes a thing or a third person to do so, or (b) remains on the land, or (c) fails to remove 
from the land a thing which he is under a duty to remove.”). 
70 Id. 
71 United States v. Alabi, 943 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1264 (D. N.M. 2013) (“The Supreme 
Court has not explicitly defined “physically intruding” as requiring an entity to invade a 
space in the physical—as opposed to virtual—world, but United States v. Jones and Florida
v. Jardines hint that such a physical-world invasion is required.”). 
72 A plaintiff could reasonably argue that the virtual placement of game pieces, such as 
Pokémon, on the plaintiff’s property is causing the players to enter the property because 
retrieval of those game pieces is required to advance in the game.
73 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“If, by any 
act of his, the actor intentionally causes a third person to enter land, he is as fully liable as 
though he himself enters. Thus, if the actor has commanded or requested a third person to 
enter land in the possession of another, the actor is responsible for the third person’s entry if 
it be a trespass. This is an application of the general principle that one who intentionally 
causes another to do an act is under the same liability as though he himself does the act in 
question.”). 
74 The Niantic terms of service read, in pertinent part:
You agree that in conjunction with your use of the Services, you will maintain safe and 
appropriate contact with other players and other people in the real world. You will not 
harass threaten or otherwise violate the legal rights of others. You will not trespass, or 
in any manner attempt to gain or gain access to any property or location where you do 
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the players would presumably remain responsible for the trespass, even if they 
were being led to private property by the game itself.
An alternative to trespassing under common law, as alleged by private 
homeowners in their complaint,75 could be nuisance. This appears to be the best 
route for claims that involve public lands. Under the Second Restatement of 
Torts, a private nuisance is defined as “a nontrespassory invasion of another’s
interest in the private use and enjoyment of land[,]”76 and a public nuisance is 
an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public.77
Plaintiffs could argue that application developers, such as Niantic, are creating 
either public or private nuisances by causing third parties to congregate near or 
around their private property and thus diminishing their use or enjoyment of the 
land. However, again, Niantic could likely defeat a nuisance claim by passing 
liability on to the player in the terms of agreement. Being forced to pursue 
claims against each individual player leaves real-world property owners with 
little recourse for violation of their property rights.
Finally, as some have suggested,78 negligence may be another route to hold 
developers, such as Niantic, liable under the current body of common law due 
to their licensing provisions presumably exculpating them from intentional torts. 
Plaintiffs could presumably allege that Niantic’s design of the application, 
which forces the players to travel to their pre-determined locations,79 causes 
unreasonable risk of damage of property. Plaintiffs could argue that Niantic 
should have been aware of the potential ramifications of dispatching thousands 
                                                                                                                     
not have a right or permission to be, and will not otherwise engage in any activity that 
may result in injury, death, property damage, nuisance, or liability of any kind. If you 
have a dispute with any third party relating to your use of Services, you release Niantic 
(and our officers, directors, agents, subsidiaries, joint ventures, and employees) from all 
claims, demands, and damages (actual and consequential) of every kind and nature, 
known and unknown, suspected and unsuspected, disclosed and undisclosed, arising out 
of or in any way connected with such disputes. 
Niantic Terms of Service, NIANTIC, https://www.nianticlabs.com/terms/en/ 
[https://perma.cc/ETG4-BTQ9].
75 See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text.
76 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
77 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“(1) A public 
nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public. (2) 
Circumstances that may sustain a holding that an interference with a public right is 
unreasonable include the following: (a) Whether the conduct involves a significant 
interference with the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort or 
the public convenience, or (b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance or 
administrative regulation, or (c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has 
produced a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know, 
has a significant effect upon the public right.”).
78 See Murphy, supra note 67; DGMS Law, Niantic May Face Pokémon Go Lawsuits 
for Nuisance and Injuries, DYER, GAROFALO, MANN & SCHULTZ (Aug. 10, 2016),
https://www.ohiotiger.com/pokemon-go-lawsuits-nuisance-injuries/ 
[https://perma.cc/R8TQ-BNCJ].
79 See Warner, supra note 30.
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of individuals to different real-world property locations.80 Developers like 
Niantic could be found to have unreasonably created a risk of damage to 
property when it dispatched unknown players to private property.81 Analogizing 
to real-world examples, it would be similar to if an individual threw large 
amounts of valuable coins on a private farm and that farm owner then sued the 
individual who retrieved the money and subsequently ruined her crops.
C. Proposed Framework for a Hybrid Property Statute
Examining these three potential routes under the existing common law 
framework and operating under the presumption that other courts will choose to 
treat AR applications similar to the Candy Lab court,82 there will need to be 
other alternative routes for dealing with real-world effects of AR applications. 
The question is how to regulate the applications in order to protect real-world 
property rights while simultaneously encouraging intellectual property 
development. Should developers like Niantic foot the bill for the real-world 
property damage caused by their intellectual property or should their intellectual 
property remain protected under the First Amendment as free speech, holding 
the individual players liable for the property damages? 
The current common law legal framework proves inadequate to answer 
these questions, primarily because of the inconsistencies in the application of 
judge-made common law and the new hybrid property rights that are emerging 
with the creation of these applications, which are not contemplated by 
contemporary tort laws.83 Tensions between intellectual property and real-world 
property owners will need a resolution within the next four to five years as AR 
applications become more popular.84 Indeed, lawsuits have already been filed.85
Continuing on the current common law regulation course would only produce 
an inconsistent body of law in an area rapidly expanding.
Treating AR applications as pure free speech fails to consider the fact that 
the placement of intellectual property on top of real-world geographic locations 
is creating a conflict of competing property rights between owners where the
intellectual property owners hold all of the bargaining chips. Courts err in 
treating AR applications similar to regular video games because AR produces 
an array of issues not seen in traditional video games.86 As a result, real-world 
                                                                                                                     
80 See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text.
81 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
82 See supra notes 51–59 and accompanying text.
83 There are very few cases that have dealt with these issues, as this is an emerging area 
of the law. As such, it is unclear how judges will apply contemporary property laws when 
they intersect with intellectual property laws. 
84 See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text.
85 See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text.
86 For example, unlike traditional video games, AR overlays the digital content onto 
geographic coordinates owned by those who do not choose to participate in the game. Know 
the Augmented Reality Technology: How Does AR Work?, NEW GEN APPS (Nov. 23, 2017), 
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property owners are experiencing uncontrollable damage to their land with no 
recourse,87 a stark contrast to the protections afforded under traditional property 
laws.88 However, making AR applications secondary to real-world property 
rights as attempted in Candy Lab will only lead to a halting of innovation,89
imposition on free speech rights,90 and a potential collapse of the AR application 
development. Thus, there must be a solution that operates within the existing 
framework of property laws, allowing for owners of property to have recourse 
against developers who are responsible for trespass onto their land.
Congress should consider issues such as virtual trespassing and real and 
intellectual property hybrid ownership.91 Any law must also be flexible and 
allow the real-world property owner to opt in to inclusion. The first step in this 
process would be to update laws with consideration given to the potential of 
non-physical invasions. As seen above, AR applications frequently result in the 
placement of intellectual property within the physical bounds of owned real 
property.92 In order to deal with this, Congress could pass legislation defining a
new statutory law that others have described as “Virtual Trespass.”93
                                                                                                                     
https://www.newgenapps.com/blog/augmented-reality-technology-how-ar-works 
[https://perma.cc/UP7S-V8XM]. In contrast, the traditional “video games” that were 
considered by the Supreme Court and subsequently afforded First Amendment protections 
involved no question of invasion of privacy or property rights. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. 
Ass’n, 564 U.S 786, 794 (2011). The games were considered only from the freedom of 
expression and content lens. See id. (holding that the California statute that created a wholly 
new category of content-based regulation directed at children was barred by First 
Amendment protections).
87 See supra notes 45–49 and accompanying text. 
88 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158, 821D (AM. LAW INST. 1965)
(providing clear statutory recourse for physical invasions onto an individual’s land).
89 See Exploring Augmented Reality, supra note 31 (discussing the implications of 
restrictive laws that may limit the ability of those in the AR field to innovate).
90 See Candy Lab Inc. v. Milwaukee Cty., 266 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1149–53 (E.D. Wis.
2017) (discussing free speech protections).
91 While others have proposed the creation of a do-not-locate registry, this solution fails 
to provide a realistic remedy to the landowners by itself. See William T. McClure, When the 
Virtual and Real Worlds Collide: Beginning to Address the Clash Between Real Property 
Rights and Augmented Reality Location-Based Technologies Through a Federal Do-Not-
Locate Registry, 103 IOWA L. REV. 331, 358–64 (2017). But see Helaine Olen, 
Congratulations! You Lost., SLATE (May 24, 2016), http://www.slate.com/articles/business
/the_bills/2016/05/robocalls_have_triumphed_over_the_do_not_call_list_whose_fault_is_i
t.html [https://perma.cc/CR5N-FPHX] (discussing the failures of the do-not-call registry). 
For example, the do-not-call registry created by the FTC has been rendered largely 
ineffective. As such, any proposed solution must carefully balance the property rights of real-
world and intellectual property owners. See McClure, supra, at 358–64. A do-not-locate 
registry would be more effective with a clear statutory remedy behind it. See Olen, supra.
92 See supra notes 40–45 and accompanying text. Additionally, AR applications can 
place intellectual property within the physical bounds of private real property in thousands 
of locations across all fifty states at one time. See generally Warner, supra note 30.
93 See Murphy, supra note 67; Yonah Reback, Virtual Trespass: Not in My Backyard,
WASH. J. LAW, TECH., & ARTS BLOG (May 12, 2017), https://wjlta.com/2017/05/12/virtual-
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Recognizing a new statutory provision would be relatively easy utilizing the 
existing framework under the Restatement of Torts.94 The trespass and nuisance 
framework could be utilized to create a statutory provision that codifies entries 
beyond those that are purely physical.95 For example, the proposed law could 
read:
Virtual Invasion of Physical Land: One is subject to liability under this statute, 
irrespective of whether he or she thereby causes harm to any legally protected 
interest of the other, if he or she intentionally and without consent (a) enters 
land in the possession of the other, or causes a thing or a third person to do so 
due to the placement of virtual intellectual property within 25 feet of the 
geographic coordinates (“GPS coordinates”) of the real physical land and (b) 
fails to remove his virtual intellectual property from within 25 feet of the real 
world geographic coordinates of the land after notice from the owner of the 
land.96
The hypothetical statute includes an opt-in or opt-out provision for real-
world owners.97 Benefactors of Pokémon Go applications could continue to 
allow applications to use their real-world locations to their benefits. For 
example, McDonald’s could provide consent to Niantic allowing the placement 
                                                                                                                     
trespass-not-in-my-backyard/ [https://perma.cc/TLF6-M5PZ]; Virtual Trespassing: How 
‘Pokémon Go’ Shakes up the Law, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 5, 2017), http://www.wsj.com/podcasts
/virtual-trespassing-how-pokemon-go-shakes-up-the-law/992F55C4-18FC-45A2-B38A-D9
7AEA438E56.html [https://perma.cc/2ZBK-687P]. 
94 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
95 While states could in theory deal with this issue on their own, the ability for one AR 
developer to intrude on thousands of landowners’ property at one time makes a federal level 
solution more desirable.
96 The proposed text here is intended to serve as a framework for any legislative 
proposals. While a fully drafted statute would need much more detail, the underlying issues 
that would need to be fixed are addressed here: allowing property owners to retain control 
of their real property while also allowing AR developers to utilize the real-world landscape. 
The statute here differs from other proposed solutions in that it provides a statutory remedy 
for landowners in addition to providing an opt-in and opt-out provision. 
97 The opt-in and opt-out provision would likely need to be implemented and 
maintained by an administrative agency, such as the FCC or FTC, via a national database. 
Such implementation steps are beyond the purview of this Note. Others have contemplated 
how such a database would work. See McClure, supra note 91, at 358–64. Presumably, the 
database could be set up online and be relatively easy to maintain. The opt-in and opt-out 
ability would be analogous to the web portal solution used in the Niantic settlement. See
supra notes 64–65. However, the opt-in and opt-out ability would apply to more than just 
one AR-based application, as requiring landowners to use a separate web portal for each AR 
application would not be an effective solution. This would give notice to all AR developers 
of when they are not allowed to place their intellectual property within certain geographic 
coordinates. However, the creation of a do-not-locate registry on its own would be 
ineffective without a defined statutory remedy for landowners. The FTC do-not-call registry 
receives millions of complaints every year with limited benefits for consumers. See Olen, 
supra note 91.
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of virtual Pokéstops within their restaurants. In return, Niantic would place
digital Pokémon on the real-world property to bring in customers for economic 
benefit. However, homeowners who have experienced nothing but detrimental 
effects from AR applications could opt out of use of their geographic 
coordinates, placing an effective “no trespassing” sign on the geographic 
coordinates of their property. This would give developers like Niantic notice 
that they should not place intellectual property near the land of property owners 
who opt out of the use of their geographic coordinates. It would also provide a 
clear statutory framework for holding developers like Niantic accountable for 
placement of intellectual property within the bounds of real property. 
Thus, this solution would allow individuals to pursue claims against the 
developers of an application rather than each individual user.98 The proposed 
text simply places intellectual and real property on an even playing field. 
Intellectual property owners could no longer take advantage of private 
landowners’ property rights without their consent to do so. As historically seen 
in property laws, the opt-in and opt-out provisions function the same way as 
physical entry typically has.99 Landholders have traditionally maintained an 
absolute right to control who comes in and out of their property, and the virtual 
trespassing law aligns these basic principles with modern day technological 
advances.100
For example, a real property owner would never be forced to allow a person 
onto their property to collect a physical game piece placed there by the creator 
of the game. However, if the maker of the game had first obtained their consent 
to do so, traditional property laws would allow this use of the land.101 Therefore, 
creation of a new form of invasion onto land, “virtual invasion,” would provide 
a catchall solution for when real and intellectual property rights conflict. 
Further, the proposed law would not harm innovation within the AR space 
because commercial property owners could still allow the placement of the 
intellectual property onto their land in exchange for the increased foot traffic 
that applications, such as Pokémon Go, could bring.102 Finally, the proposed 
                                                                                                                     
98 With an established database providing notice to developers, property owners could 
more easily pursue claims against these developers who still placed intellectual property on 
the property owners’ real-world property. This would be a much more realistic route for 
relief as opposed to being forced to pursue each player for claims of trespass or nuisance, for 
example.
99 John Alan Cohan, Private and Public Necessity and the Violation of Property Rights,
83 N.D. L. REV. 651, 658 (2007) (discussing status as a guest); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 158 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (trespass section).
100 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 cmt. c, e (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
101 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“Conduct 
which would otherwise constitute a trespass is not a trespass if it is privileged. Such a 
privilege may be derived from the consent of the possessor . . . .”).
102 Sheeraz Raza, How Pokémon Go Influenced the Stock Market & Economy,
VALUEWALK (Sept. 19, 2016), http://www.valuewalk.com/2016/09/pokemon-go-
influenced-stock-market-economy-infographic/ [https://perma.cc/7QFK-FJGF] (discussing 
the economic benefit to McDonald’s from advertising Pokémon Go).
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statutory text would avoid First Amendment issues seen in Candy Lab altogether 
by regulating the geographic coordinates of where all intellectual property can 
be placed, rather than dealing with any restrictions on the content itself.
IV. AUGMENTED REALITY AND TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
In addition to physical world effects and property disputes, AR applications 
also present potential issues for areas of intellectual property, such as trademark 
law. To illustrate AR’s potential, imagine a scenario where a brand’s trademark 
triggers the display of other related products in an AR application.103 For 
example, a consumer enters a store wearing a pair of Google Glass104 and gazes 
upon the aisles, finding something that she wants to purchase. Instead of pulling 
out her smartphone and searching for reviews of the specific product, the 
trademarked logo on product X triggers her glasses to display five related brands 
on the screen, one with better online reviews, with an immediate option to 
purchase. Instead of purchasing product X in store, the consumer purchases 
product Y directly from Amazon and walks out of the store empty-handed.105
In this scenario, (1) the retailer has lost a sale and (2) product X lost out to 
product Y. Was the use of product X’s trademark to trigger the display of other 
related brands trademark infringement under the Lanham Act?
In a similar scenario, imagine an AR application that displays a constant 
stream of information on an individual’s Google Glass or car windshield106 as
they drive down the street. When the software recognizes a Panera Bread 
trademark, the application displays related restaurants within a five-mile radius 
on the dashboard, one of which is a direct competitor of Panera—Potbelly 
Sandwiches. Seeing that Potbelly is only two miles down the road, the 
individual decides to go there instead of Panera. Was the display of other, 
                                                                                                                     
103 In this example, the AR application would recognize a brand’s trademark via the 
device’s camera and then display other related products based on that recognized trademark. 
There is also the possibility that another brand’s trademark could be superimposed on top of 
the real-world trademark within the device’s screen.
104 See Fairfield, supra note 4, at 56–57 and accompanying text. Google Glass is only 
an example here. There has been recent speculation that Apple may also release a pair of 
glasses that can overlay information over real world objects through the lens. See Gerald 
Lynch, Apple AR Glasses Release Date, News, and Rumors, TECHRADAR (Aug. 30, 2018), 
https://www.techradar.com/news/apple-ar-glasses-release-date-news-and-rumors 
[https://perma.cc/AZ86-ZWGL]. 
105 In this hypothetical, the consumer could have purchased product Y because it had 
better reviews, or alternatively, she thought (i.e., was confused) that it was a product by the 
same company and would rather just have it shipped to her house from Amazon instead of 
buying it in store.
106 AR displays within car windshields are a huge potential growth market for AR. These 
types of technologies have been contemplated within the past couple of years. See Darrell 
Etherington, WayRay’s AR In-Car HUD Convinced Me HUDs Can Be Better, TECHCRUNCH
(2017), https://techcrunch.com/2018/01/09/wayrays-ar-in-car-hud-convinced-me-huds-can-
be-better/ [https://perma.cc/7CJF-JEFX]. 
2019] PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF AR 599
similar restaurants upon seeing Panera’s trademark infringement under the 
Lanham Act or was it equivalent to using the geographic coordinates of other 
restaurants to display the consumer’s options, similar to Google Maps?
A. Actionable Use and the Rescuecom Decision
The question in the above scenarios is whether the Lanham Act is sufficient 
to protect against an AR application’s use of a brand’s trademark to display 
competing trademarks.107 Under the Lanham Act, trademark infringement can 
occur in two primary ways: likelihood of confusion and dilution.108 There are 
other possible routes of infringement, such as initial interest confusion.109
However, utilizing the traditional likelihood of confusion test for trademark 
infringement may prove problematic for the hypothetical scenarios due to the 
requirement that a mark be used in connection with the sale of goods or services 
before any infringement can occur, otherwise known as the actionable use 
requirement.110
Under Sections 32 and 43 of the Lanham Act, infringement occurs when 
any person uses in commerce any registered mark in connection with the sale, 
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in 
connection with which is likely to cause confusion.111 Each circuit court uses a 
                                                                                                                     
107 In these scenarios, AR applications are using the trademarks within the software 
itself. The software recognizes the trademark via the camera and then displays the related or 
competing results on the screen. See generally Brian Wassom, Copyright in an Augmented 
Reality, WASSOM.COM (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.wassom.com/copyright-in-an-
augmented-reality.html [https://perma.cc/4XCS-3MTJ].
108 GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION:
LAW AND POLICY 483, 621 (4th ed. 2014).
109 See Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423 F.3d 539, 549 (6th Cir. 
2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1179 (2006) (“Initial-interest confusion takes place when a 
manufacturer improperly uses a trademark to create initial customer interest in a product, 
even if the customer realizes, prior to purchase, that the product was not actually 
manufactured by the trademark-holder.”). 
110 DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 108, at 493. 
111 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012). Lanham Act Section 32 
states that:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant--
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of 
a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or 
advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely 
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or (b) reproduce, counterfeit, 
copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, 
copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or 
advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, 
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection 
with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall 
be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided. 
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separate “likelihood of confusion” test that examines different factors, such as 
similarity of the marks,112 sophistication of consumers,113 strength of the 
mark,114 and channels of commerce.115 Before the factor analysis is applied, 
however, the court must find that the defendant has met the “actionable use”
requirement, at least in some circuits.116
Each of the hypothetical scenarios involves AR applications that utilize 
trademarked logos to provide the user with related products or places that they 
want to visit. Essentially, the hypotheticals both illustrate the use of a brand 
trademark image as a “keyword” in order to trigger the display of other brands’
trademarks. Usage of trademarks as keywords, albeit in the text form, has 
proved problematic for the courts before. In Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, the 
Second Circuit found that Google’s program AdWords,117 which allowed for a 
                                                                                                                     
15 U.SC. § 1114 (2012) (emphasis added). Therefore, under the plain text of the Act, 
presumably, a retailer could possibly be held liable for the use of another company’s
trademark, but only if it caused consumer confusion or was used in connection with the sale 
of goods or services. Id.
112 The similarity of the marks factor is used in all the circuit tests and examines the 
degree of similarity between the two marks from a consumer perspective. DINWOODIE &
JANIS, supra note 108, at 521–23. Courts often examine the sight, sound, and meaning of the 
work from the viewpoint of how the marks are seen by the consumer when the products are 
purchased. Id.; see also Virgin Enters., Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(discussing the similarity of the marks factor).
113 The sophistication of the consumers takes the level of consumer knowledge into 
account. For example, highly trained professionals know the market and are less likely to be 
misled or consumed by the similarity of the marks than someone purchasing a quick and 
cheap item, such as gum. See Virgin Enters., 335 F.3d at 151.
114 The strength of the mark examines both inherent and acquired distinctiveness. For 
example, the Virgin court found that the Virgin mark was stronger because of its inherent 
distinctiveness (arbitrary and distinctive), and it also had acquired distinctiveness because of 
its famous name recognition. Id. at 147–48. The stronger the mark, the greater the likelihood 
that the public will assume the second use comes from the same source as the first. Id.
115 The channels of commerce factor examines how the products are sold. For example, 
it would be easier to find likelihood of confusion if the two products are both sold at small 
electronics stores. Id. at 150.
116 The actionable use requirement examines whether the defendant has used a particular 
mark in connection with the sale of goods or services. See DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 
108, at 510–14. Actionable use is a prerequisite intended to limit infringement causes of 
action. Id.; infra note 127.
117 The Adwords program by Google worked by displaying the advertiser’s ad when a 
term that they had purchased appeared. Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 126 
(2d Cir. 2009) (“For example, using Google’s Adwords, Company Y, a company engaged 
in the business of furnace repair, can cause Google to display its advertisement and link 
whenever a user of Google launches a search based on the search term, ‘furnace repair.’
Company Y can also cause its ad and link to appear whenever a user searches for the term 
‘Company X,’ a competitor of Company Y in the furnace repair business. Thus, whenever a 
searcher interested in purchasing furnace repair services from Company X launches a search 
of the term X (Company X’s trademark), an ad and link would appear on the searcher’s
screen, inviting the searcher to the furnace repair services of X’s competitor, Company Y. 
And if the searcher clicked on Company Y’s link, Company Y’s website would open on the 
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company to purchase another company’s word-based trademark in order to gain 
more search appearances on Google, was a “use in commerce” under the 
Lanham Act.118 The court explained that the situation differed from traditional 
“product placement” because Google’s practices were not benign, in fact, 
consumer usage of one mark would intentionally direct them towards another 
mark, often resulting in business for the mark who paid for the placement.119
The court found that traditional product placement could result in infringement 
as well if it created consumer confusion and resulted in consumers purchasing 
an off-brand product when they meant to purchase a famous brand’s product.120
While at first glance the AR hypotheticals appear to fit directly within the 
holding in Rescuecom, there are key differences, which may result in limited or 
no protection under the current Lanham Act. There are a number of courts and 
scholars that took issue with the line of reasoning used by the Rescuecom court 
before it was decided.121 Primarily, the disagreement centered upon whether the 
triggering of Brand X’s trademark by a third-party app or even by Brand Y itself 
constitutes a “use in connection with the sale of goods or services” as required 
to advance to the infringement tests.122 For example, courts had frequently 
found, especially prior to the Rescuecom holding, that keyword type purchases 
were not considered “actionable use.”123 These courts primarily relied upon the 
                                                                                                                     
searcher’s screen, and the searcher might be able to order or purchase Company Y’s furnace 
repair services.”). 
118 Id. at 127. 
119 Id. at 130–31. A hypothetical would be if Burger King bought advertising on Google 
and Google gave them the option to purchase the trademarked word “McDonald’s.” The 
result of this scenario would be that when a user searched for “McDonald’s” this would 
trigger the search engine to display results for Burger King in addition to results for 
McDonald’s. Thus, if that user ended up going to Burger King, then McDonald’s trademark 
would be providing Burger King with business and Google with ad revenue. 
120 Id.
121 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005); S&L 
Vitamins, Inc. v. Australian Gold, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 2d 188, 199–202 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Site 
Pro-1, Inc. v. Better Metal, LLC, 506 F. Supp. 2d 123 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); see, e.g., Margreth 
Barrett, Domain Names, Trademarks and the First Amendment: Searching for Meaningful 
Boundaries, 39 CONN. L. REV. 973, 984–85 (2007); Margreth Barrett, Finding Trademark 
Use: The Historical Foundation for Limiting Infringement Liability to Uses “In the Manner 
of a Mark,” 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 893 (2008) [hereinafter Barrett, Finding].
122 See supra note 120 and accompanying text. Before Rescuecom, the courts split on 
whether keyword purchases or keyword sales constituted actionable use for infringement. 
See, e.g., DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 108, at 510–11 (listing various decisions that split 
on the keyword issue, such as N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, 522 F.3d 1211 (11th 
Cir. 2008); J.G Wentworth S.S.C Ltd. Partnership v. Settlement Funding, 85 U.S.P.Q. 2d 
1780 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Google v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., 74 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1385 
(N.D. Cal. 2005) (agreeing with the Rescuecom reasoning). Contra Merck & Co., Inc. v. 
Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc. 425 F. Supp. 2d 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), reconsideration 
denied, 431 F. Supp. 2d 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)).
123 See, e.g., S & L Vitamins, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 2d at 199–202; Merck., 425 F. Supp. 2d
at 415.
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reasoning used in a 2005 decision by the Second Circuit, 1-800 Contacts, Inc. 
v. WhenU.com.124
In addition to the courts, scholars have been divided over whether to side 
with the reasoning found in 1-800 Contacts or Rescuecom.125 Prior to the 
Rescuecom holding, authors Dinwoodie and Janis asserted that the balance of 
scholarly articles favored “a stringent actionable use requirement akin to that 
espoused in 1-800 Contacts.”126 Additional scholars have advocated that 
defining use in a traditional sense under the Lanham Act would require courts
to find that companies, such as Google, have not used the mark in commerce.127
While the Rescuecom reasoning is certainly still a volatile legal doctrine in 
terms of online advertising and metadata tags,128 application of the holding to 
non-verbal marks, such as those used by AR applications, creates an even more 
uncertain scenario. For example, the Rescuecom court’s analysis centered quite 
heavily on the fact that unlike in 1-800 Contacts, Google was using the 
plaintiff’s trademark to trigger another brand’s trademark.129 In the same vein, 
the court relied upon the fact that Google was generating advertising revenue by 
recommending and selling the word “Rescuecom” to other companies in order 
to find that Google itself was using the mark “in commerce.”130 Examining the 
case in this light, it appears the reasoning could be somewhat limited to its facts. 
AR applications would not necessarily involve directly using a brand’s
                                                                                                                     
124 1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d at 407–09, 412 (finding that the defendant did not use, 
reproduce, or display the plaintiff’s mark at all to trigger the display of other competing 
marks, and therefore, no actionable use).
125 See supra notes 120, 121, 124 and accompanying text.
126 DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 108, at 511.
127 Barrett, Finding, supra note 121, at 977 (“The historical ‘trademark use’ prerequisite 
to infringement liability clearly remains in United States law today, and courts should 
construe and apply it in light of its original purpose and in light of modern circumstances 
and public policy concerns. While there may be other factors that courts might beneficially 
entertain, close, direct association, perceptibility, and ‘separate commercial impression’ are 
directly linked to the historical background and purpose of the trademark use doctrine and 
promote a range of public policy interests.”).
128 Arielle G. Lenza, Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 52 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 137
(2007) (providing an analysis of the Rescuecom decision).
129 Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 2009) (“1-800 suggested 
in dictum that is highly relevant to our case that had the defendant used the plaintiff’s
trademark as the trigger to pop-up an advertisement, such conduct might, depending on other 
elements, have been actionable.”).
130 Id. at 126–27 (“Many of Rescuecom’s competitors advertise on the Internet. Through 
its Keyword Suggestion Tool, Google has recommended the Rescuecom trademark to 
Rescuecom’s competitors as a search term to be purchased. Rescuecom’s competitors, some 
responding to Google’s recommendation, have purchased Rescuecom’s trademark as a 
keyword in Google’s AdWords program, so that whenever a user launches a search for the 
term ‘Rescuecom,’ seeking to be connected to Rescuecom’s website, the competitors’
advertisement and link will appear on the searcher’s screen. This practice allegedly allows 
Rescuecom’s competitors to deceive and divert users searching for Rescuecom’s website.”).
2019] PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF AR 603
trademark, but rather just recognizing it via preprogrammed or adaptive 
software.131
B. A Twenty-First Century Definition of “Actionable Use”
Current law is unclear what the outcome would be if a hypothetical like one
proposed at the beginning of the Part was to make its way to one of the circuit 
courts and therefore, Congress should refresh the Lanham Act in order to 
consider the rapidly developing technology of AR. Scenarios like those 
proposed above are not that far off from being a reality;132 in fact, the technology 
for these scenarios is already being utilized in non-monetized situations133 and 
the technology exists to augment virtual advertisements on top of real-world 
advertisements or brand identifiers.134
Trademark law has not previously dealt with AR technologies. Within the 
past ten years, technology has grown at a rapid pace, requiring the laws to play 
catch-up.135 In addition to this historical aspect, Rescuecom and lack of clarity 
on the topic of actionable use as related to keyword advertising and metadata 
tags illustrates the need for a congressional refresh of the Lanham Act. This 
route would avoid each circuit handling the issue and creating a body of 
inconsistent laws governing AR and actionable use.136 This argument is 
bolstered when examining the broad differences between each circuit in their 
analyses and the general inconsistency when the factor analysis is applied.137
Thus, Congress should take preemptive action in order to preserve the integrity 
of the Lanham Act and preserve the value of trademarks in the virtual world. 
                                                                                                                     
131 The key difference here is that Google was actually selling the term “Rescuecom.”
However, presumably applications could become so advanced that they recognize various 
trademarks by conducting real-time Internet searches triggered by their software, and then 
recommend related results based upon the results of that search. A company could pay an 
AR developer so that certain Internet searches produced certain results. This scenario does 
not fit in the text of the Lanham Act, and it does not appear to fit within the reasoning used 
by the Rescuecom court.
132 See supra notes 2–7 and accompanying text.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 See Daniel Malan, The Law Can’t Keep Up with New Tech. Here’s How to Close the 
Gap, WORLD ECON. FORUM (June 21, 2018), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/06/law
-too-slow-for-new-tech-how-keep-up/ [https://perma.cc/W384-UHQD].
136 Some circuits, such as the Second Circuit, do not require “trademark use” to be liable 
for trademark infringement, while others, such as the Sixth and Eighth Circuits, do apply a 
“trademark use” requirement. PETER S. MENELL ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2018, 984 (2018). The inconsistent application of the use 
requirement across the circuits bolsters the argument for a Lanham Act revision. Id.
137 See DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 108, at 521–23. For example, the factor analysis 
differs between each circuit, and circuits frequently assign different tests and analyses to deal 
with different factors. Id. (providing a chart that shows the different factors considered by 
each circuit court).
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The result of Congress failing to update the Lanham Act would be costly, 
cumbersome, and confusing. If a court takes the more traditional 1-800 Contacts
view on use in commerce, advocated by some scholars, then companies may not 
be able to protect their brand identifiers from usage in the internal processes of 
third-party applications or other companies’ applications. Big box retailers and 
automotive companies could use each trademark as a trigger for displaying 
competing trademarks under the guise of fair use.138 Alternatively, if the court 
fails to distinguish from the Rescuecom decision, AR application growth may 
be hurt because of the lack of innovation due to an amplified fear of trademark 
infringement, which is often costly litigation, especially for new startups.139
Thus, the solution must be one that prevents companies from using trademarks 
for monetary benefit, but still allows for informational or descriptive uses of the 
mark that are protected by fair use and do not result in misdirection or confusion 
of consumers.
Congress has previously updated the Lanham Act to periodically refresh 
what was meant by “use in commerce” under the Act.140 Additionally, circuit 
courts have recently asked Congress to update and clarify what in fact is meant 
by “use in commerce” under § 45 of the Lanham Act.141 Allowing for each 
                                                                                                                     
138 Under § 33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act, “the use of the name, term, or device charged 
to be an infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark . . . of a term or device which is 
descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of such 
party, or their geographic origin . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (2012). Presumably then, a company 
like Ford or Kroger could argue that their AR applications were merely describing the types 
of products and identifying them rather than causing any confusion to the consumer. 
139 Charles P. Lickson, Trademark Protection: Is Litigation Worth the Cost?, IP
WATCHDOG (May 23, 2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/05/23/trademark-protection
-is-litigation-worth-the-cost/id=40711/ [https://perma.cc/6QT8-PEZDJ] (discussing the 
costs of trademark litigation); see also Tim Molino, If Your Startup Is Really Disruptive, 
Expect to Be Sued by a Patent Troll, ENTREPRENEUR (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.entrepren
eur.com/article/296625 [https://perma.cc/9U7W-R66Z] (illustrating the general principle 
that disruptive companies will be sued quickly and at high cost in the IP space).
140 Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (effective 
Nov. 16, 1989) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006)); see Summary: H.R 5372 – 100TH 
Congress (1987-1988), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/100th-congress/
house-bill/5372 [https://perma.cc/46GQ-4254] (“Amends the Lanham Act to permit a person 
who has a bona fide intention to use a trademark in commerce to apply to register the 
trademark. (Current law provides only for registration of a trademark already in use in 
commerce.) Requires that such trademark actually be used in commerce before it becomes a 
registered trademark.”); see also Aycock Engineering, Inc. v. Airflite, Inc., 560 F.3d 1350, 
1357 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Despite the seeming harmony and simplicity in the application of 
the use requirement to trademarks and service marks, opportunity exists for confusion in this 
area of the law . . . in 1988, Congress passed the Trademark Law Revision Act (“TLRA”). 
The TLRA altered the burden that applicants must meet before satisfying the use element by 
requiring an applicant to make a ‘bona fide use of [the] mark in the ordinary course of 
trade.’”).
141 See Rescuecom Corp v. Google., Inc., 562 F.3d 123, Appendix (2d Cir. 2009) (“We 
assumed in the body of the opinion, in accordance with the holding of 1-800, that the 
requirements of the second sentence of the definition of ‘use in commerce’ in § 1127 apply 
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circuit to handle this issue would be a mistake for a number of reasons. 
Continuing down the common law route for these highly complex issues 
provides inconsistent guidance to innovators in the AR field and results in 
expensive litigation for companies across the board. As seen in 1-800 Contacts
and Rescuecom, trademark cases are often quite fact specific.142 Additionally, 
there are a number of scenarios beyond the hypotheticals here that may arise 
rapidly once the technology becomes more and more commonplace. Finally, 
AR application growth may be stunted if the makers of the applications are not 
clear on what constitutes an actionable use under the Lanham Act.
Thus, Congress should update the Lanham Act to consider new mediums 
and make it clear that usage of a registered trademark to trigger other trademarks 
for the purposes of sale of information or misdirection of consumers is a use in 
commerce and a violation of the Lanham Act. This would be an easy correction 
using the existing statutory definition and within the spirit of the Act itself.143
For example, the amendment could read:
A person or entity that intentionally uses a registered or unregistered 
trademark’s image, text, being, or likeness externally or internally in software 
or programmed code to trigger the display of another brand’s trademark with 
intent to misdirect or mislead consumers from the original source of the 
trademark shall be found to have used the mark in commerce for the purposes 
of sections 32 and 43 of this Act . . . .144
This amendment to the Act would protect the brand’s trademark in the AR 
space and operate in the same way as the holding in Rescuecom did for online 
advertisements.145 Companies would fulfill the actionable use requirement if 
                                                                                                                     
to infringing conduct and found that such use in commerce was adequately pleaded. . . . It 
would be helpful for Congress to study and clear up this ambiguity.”). 
142 See generally 1-800 Contacts, Inc., v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 
2005); Rescuecom, 562 F.3d 123.
143 See Krystil McDowall, A Critical Look at “Use” Under the Lanham Act, 4 N.Y.U.
J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 227, 230 (2015) (“It is a fundamental rule of trademark law that 
creating or merely adopting a mark, on its own, is insufficient to create trademark rights.”); 
see also Aycock Engineering, Inc. v. Airflite, Inc. 580 F.3d 1350, 1358 (2009) (“The use 
provision of the Lanham Act in force in 1970 stated that a service mark was in use in 
commerce ‘when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services, and the services 
are rendered in commerce, or the services are rendered in more than one State or in this and 
a foreign country and the person rendering the services is engaged in commerce in 
connection therewith.’ Pub. 4L. No. 87–772, 76 Stat. 769 (1962).”).
144 Of course, the proposed text here is not perfect. There are scenarios that may advance 
beyond the technology contemplated in this Note. However, the proposed text gives a basic 
principle that utilizing a trademark’s image for monetized ad revenue will not be allowed 
under the Lanham Act and will allow the courts to more easily interpret future AR cases.
145 Recall that the holding in Rescuecom essentially prevented Google from allowing 
misleading results to be displayed in their search engine because another brand had 
purchased a protected trademark. Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 130–31 
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they had used another’s trademark to intentionally funnel business to other 
companies. As such, the proposed amendment deals only with the actionable 
use requirement and would leave the likelihood of confusion test in place for 
each circuit.146 Thus, a trademark holder could sue an AR developer if that 
developer had used their trademark for the purpose of misdirecting or 
misleading consumers. However, the amendment would not guarantee that the 
AR developer was liable. The trademark holder would still have to prove that 
infringement had occurred.
The amendment also would allow AR developers to assert any traditional 
defense under trademark, such as fair use.147 The proposed amendment would 
only prevent companies from having their software recognize specific visual 
trademarks for the sole purpose of overlaying another company’s trademark on 
top of that real-world trademark or misdirecting consumers. Thus, a company 
could use a brand’s trademark in an AR application to provide information about 
the company, similar to the way Google Maps functions, as this would not be 
misdirecting or misleading consumers.148 In this sense, the proposed text merely 
brings the Lanham Act into the twenty-first century and prevents companies 
from causing consumer confusion by overlaying their brand identifiers over 
another.
V. AUGMENTED REALITY AND COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
For full protection of intellectual property, copyright law must also be 
brought into the Twenty-First century. In fact, copyright law may be most 
impacted by the development of new AR technologies. To illustrate the need to 
refine the current copyright laws, imagine a scenario where a patron wearing 
Google Glass149 enters a museum or an art gallery filled with copyrighted works 
and designs. The patron paid money for entry to the museum and downloaded 
                                                                                                                     
(2d Cir. 2009). Similarly, the proposed text here prevents AR developers from selling a 
company’s image trademark to competing companies.
146 As stated in Rescuecom, finding “use” of a mark is only one step of the infringement 
analysis. Id. at 130. (“‘Needless to say, a defendant must do more than use another’s mark 
in commerce to violate the Lanham Act. The gist of a Lanham Act violation is an 
unauthorized use, which ‘is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as 
to the affiliation, . . . or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of . . . goods [or] 
services.’ citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); Estee Lauder Inc. v. The Gap, Inc., 108 F.3d 1503, 
1508–09 (2d Cir. 1997).”).
147 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (b)(4) (fair use provision); see Trademark Overview, supra note 9
(discussing the two fair use defenses available under the Lanham Act).
148 For clarity, under the proposed text, an AR application that only presented digital 
information about the particular recognized trademark would still be allowed. For example, 
if the software recognized a Panera Bread trademark it could still present information, such 
as how to order online or reviews for the particular establishment. What the proposed text 
seeks to prevent is another company using that trademark to siphon business away from the 
trademark owner and confuse the person using the application.
149 See supra note 104.
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an AR application before entering. Browsing the museum, the patron stumbles 
upon a painting or model. At that moment, the downloaded application overlays 
both historical information as well as new images, sounds, and videos on top of 
the existing painting or model, creating a new digital work on the device’s
screen. There are two interrelated questions that arise under this scenario, one 
of copyright infringement and one of copyrightability. First, assuming that the 
physical work was protected under the Act, does the new work on the device’s
screen infringe on its copyright? Second, is the new work eligible for 
independent copyright protection by the AR application developer, or is it a 
derivative work of the original and thus protected by the original owner’s
copyright?
A. Copyright Protection Requirements for AR
Software has been eligible for copyright protection since 1976.150 In 1976, 
Congress amended the Copyright Act (Act) to provide for protection of 
computer software, analogizing the software to literary works.151 However, 
since that amendment, there has been a body of inconsistent law resulting in 
certain elements of software to be protected while others are not. Naturally, the 
intricacies of the AR applications will raise a number of issues. First, it must be 
determined whether AR works fulfill the basic requirements of originality and 
fixation to be eligible for copyright protection under the Act. 
In order for a work to be eligible for copyright protection under the Act, the 
work must be fixed and original.152 A work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of 
expression when, “its embodiment . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to 
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period 
of more than transitory duration.”153 As others have stated, digital works 
presented problems with the fixation requirement because of the inherent 
intangible nature of digital technology.154 However, courts have generally found 
                                                                                                                     
150 JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 206 (5th 
ed. 2012).
151 Id. at 206–07 (discussing how software reflects creative decisions, like literary 
works, and Congress utilized this analogy in the 1976 Act).
152 JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 10 (Supp. 
2012); see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT BASICS (2017), available at
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ01.pdf [https://perma.cc/44PB-3NDR] (“Copyright is a 
form of protection provided by the laws of the United States to the authors of ‘original works 
of authorship’ that are fixed in a tangible form of expression.”).
153 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (definition section). 
154 See Evan Brown, Fixed Perspectives: The Evolving Contours of the Fixation 
Requirement in Copyright Law, 10 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 17, 21 (2014) (“But as 
technology advanced and the panoply of expressive media expanded, a more fluid concept 
was required to keep pace.”).
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the fixation requirement to be fulfilled even where the digital display changes 
from user to user.155
In the context of AR, it is important to determine whether the works 
displayed on a device’s screen are considered “fixed” if the work is only shown 
on a screen when a user looks at a particular real world object or image.156 As 
stated, the threshold for the fixation requirement is relatively low.157 Courts 
examining similar issues have found that virtual elements can be considered 
fixed even though they are not permanent. In the early computing case of 
Williams Electronics, Inc. v Artic International, Inc., the court found that the 
change in visual experience from player to player still allowed for the 
underlying elements of the game to be fixed.158 Because the fixation 
requirement merely requires a work to exist for longer than a transitory duration, 
it is highly likely that digital AR works will fulfill the fixation requirement.159
A work must also be “original” to be copyrightable.160 The originality 
requirement stems primarily from a policy perspective of requiring at least some 
amount of creativity in order to be eligible for copyright protection.161 Courts 
have been unclear on exactly how much creativity or originality is required in 
order to qualify for copyright protections,162 although courts have generally held 
that direct copies of objects in other mediums are not eligible for copyright 
                                                                                                                     
155 See Williams Elec., Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1982) (finding 
that although the video game at issue created new images each time a particular mode was
displayed, the fixation requirement was met because the underlying circuit board was 
sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be reproduced, or otherwise communicated 
for more than a transitory period).
156 An AR application would only show the superimposed image on a screen if that 
application was pointed at an image that it recognized. At that point, the application would 
overlay the digital content over the physical object on the device’s screen. When the user 
moved the screen away from the object, the object would no longer be displayed on the 
device’s screen.
157 Brown, supra note 154, at 24 (discussing how after the Williams decision, fixation 
was generally “no longer a barrier to the development of digital works”).
158 See id. (discussing the Williams decision).
159 See MAI Sys. v. Peak Comput., Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517–18 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding 
that the loading of software onto a computer’s RAM for only a brief period of time fulfilled 
the fixation requirement). Similarly, an AR application will likely show the underlying work 
on the device’s screen, if only for a brief period of time.
160 See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
161 COHEN ET AL., supra note 150, at 61 (2015) (“[F]rom an economic perspective, the 
mere copyist has supplied nothing to justify the cost of a grant of copyright; from a 
noneconomic perspective, the copyist has supplied nothing of his or her ‘own.’”).
162 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that lower courts often misunderstood the 
originality requirement. See Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S 340, 351–53
(1991) (“Most courts construed the 1909 Act correctly, notwithstanding the less-than-perfect 
statutory language. They understood from this Court’s decisions that there could be no
copyright without originality. . . . [B]ut some courts misunderstood the statute . . . [m]aking 
matters worse; these courts developed a new theory to justify the protection of factual 
compilations.”).
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protection.163 For example, in Meshwerks v. Toyota, the court determined that 
the replicated computer models of Toyota’s cars were not eligible for copyright 
protection irrespective of the large amount of effort and work required to create 
those models.164 As the court stated, “Meshwerk’s digital wire-frame computer 
models depict Toyota’s vehicles without any individualized features. . . . [in] 
short its models reflect none of the decisions that can make depictions of things 
or facts in the world . . . .”165 Applying this same reasoning to AR, it is unlikely 
that a court would find exact digital replications of real-world objects or 
commonplace symbols to be eligible for copyright protection if digitally 
replicated via AR applications. 
B. Derivative Works or Original Works?
However, the scenario outlined at the beginning of this Part differs 
substantially from the Meshwerks case, as it potentially creates a “derivative 
work”166 instead of a new, original work. The original holder of a copyright 
maintains the right to prepare derivative works.167 Thus, if courts were to find 
that AR applications were creating derivative works, AR application developers 
would risk expensive copyright infringement suits unless they were protected 
by the fair use doctrine.168 In contrast, if courts were to find that AR applications 
were creating new, original works, then the AR application owner could 
potentially start copyrighting anything that crossed the originality threshold 
when the graphics are overlaid on top of the original work.169
                                                                                                                     
163 Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[T]he mere 
reproduction of the Disney characters in plastic, even though the adaptation of the preexisting 
works to this medium undoubtedly involved some degree of manufacturing skill, does not 
constitute originality as this Court has defined the term.”).
164 Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1270 (10th Cir. 
2008). 
165 Id. at 1265.
166 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT IN DERIVATIVE WORKS AND COMPILATIONS
(2013), available at https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ14.pdf [https://perma.cc/MG5U-
UDV2]. The United States Copyright Office defines a derivative work as a work based on 
or derived from one or more already existing works. Id. Derivative works must incorporate 
some or all of the preexisting work and add new original copyrightable authorship to that 
work. Id.
167 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012). Under Section 106 of the Act, the copyright owner has 
the exclusive rights to “prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.” Id.
168 Essentially, holding that AR applications are creating derivative works would open 
developers up to litigation. This is because the right to create derivative works belongs to the 
copyright holder.
169 In contrast to the above, holding that AR applications are creating original works 
would allow developers to take existing copyrighted works and augment them with digital 
elements to obtain their own copyright protection on new work.
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Derivative works are one of the most disputed areas of copyright law.170
Derivative works are protected by copyright under Section 106(2), and 
protection of derivative works is a fundamental right in copyright law.171 In 
addition, Section 103(a) provides that derivative works meeting the statutory 
standards of Section 102 are independently copyrightable.172 Whether AR is 
transformative enough to create a new original work or if AR devices are merely 
creating derivative works protectable by the original copyright owner is an 
undecided question. 
While courts have not yet spoken directly on the issue of whether AR 
overlays create new, original works or derivative works, looking at the legal 
debate surrounding photographs provides insight into the difficulty resolving 
the issue without any statutory clarity. The Seventh Circuit has stated, 
“[W]hether photographs of copyrighted work are derivative works is the subject
of deep disagreement among courts and commentators alike.”173 In Schrock v. 
Learning Curve International, Inc., the court examined whether photographs 
taken of toys were derivative works or original works eligible for their own 
copyright protection.174 That court first looked at the technical choices made by 
the photographer to determine that the photographs passed the ordinary test for 
originality.175 Second, that court rejected the contention that derivative works 
are subject to a higher level of originality and agreed that the relevant standard 
was whether a derivative work contained a “nontrivial” variation from the 
                                                                                                                     
170 See Pamela Samuelson, The Quest for a Sound Conception of Copyright’s Derivative 
Work Right, 101 GEO L.J. 1505, 1509–10, 1549–50 (2013) (discussing how even basic 
mediums, such as photography, which have been around since the introduction of the 
Copyright Act, have been subject to unclear case law about what makes them derivative 
works). 
171 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“A derivative work is a work based upon one or more 
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, 
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, 
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A 
work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications, 
which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship is a ‘derivative work.’”). See 
generally Daniel Gervais, The Derivative Right, or Why Copyright Law Protects Foxes 
Better than Hedgehogs, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 785 (2013).
172 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2012); COHEN ET AL., supra note 150, at 11.
173 Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 518 (7th Cir. 2009).
174 Id. HIT, the copyright owner in the Schrock case, hired a photographer to take 
product photographs of its toys for promotional use. Id. at 516. The photographer took 
numerous photos over the course of four years as directed by the party’s contractual 
agreement, choosing the lighting, sets, etc. Id. The photographer then sought to register the 
photos for copyright protection. Id. The district court found that the lack of permission from 
HIT was a bar to copyright protection. See id. at 517.
175 Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 519 (7th Cir. 2009). The court 
determined that the choices made by the photographer combined “to create a two-
dimensional image that is subtly but nonetheless sufficiently his own.” Id.
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preexisting work.176 Accordingly, the court held that because the photographs 
contained distinguishable changes, they qualified for derivative work copyright 
protection.177
Some courts and scholars have attempted to further clarify what exactly 
qualifies as a derivative work. In Ty Inc. v. Publications International Ltd., the 
court determined that collector’s guide was not a derivative work because 
“guides don’t recast, transform, or adapt the things to which they are guides.”178
Courts have also found that a shift in medium without more is generally 
insufficient to satisfy the requirement of originality for copyright in a derivative 
work.179 Additionally, in Micro Star v. FormGen, the Ninth Circuit examined 
whether custom levels created within a video game where derivative works of 
the original video game.180 The defendant in the case used these user-created 
levels to create their own video game.181 The user-created levels utilized “MAP 
files”182 that triggered different audiovisual displays. That court examined the 
derivative work requirement noting that the Ninth Circuit had previously 
required that in order to qualify as a “derivative work” that work must exist in a 
“concrete or permanent form” and must substantially incorporate protected 
material from the preexisting work.183 The court found that the MAP files at 
                                                                                                                     
176 Id. at 520–22. The court distinguished this case from other decisions, which have 
held that derivative works should perhaps be subject to more stringent originality 
requirements. Id.
177 Id. at 522. The court held that because the photographs were highly accurate but 
“contain minimally sufficient variation in angle, perspective, lighting, and dimension to be 
distinguishable from the underlying works . . . the photos qualify for the limited derivative-
work copyright.” Id.
178 Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 520 (7th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). 
179 See e.g., Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 519 n.3 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(citing Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 1980); L. Batlin & 
Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1976)).
180 Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 1998). FormGen created 
and obtained copyright protection for the game “Duke Nukem 3D,” which included a custom 
level-building program in the game. Id. Users were encouraged to create their own levels 
that were then playable by other players. Id. Micro Star took 300 user-created levels and sold 
them on a new disc titled “Nuke It.” Id. FormGen then sought to enforce its copyright 
protection and prevent Micro Star from using the user-created levels in their own game. Id.
The court described the game at issue as having three separate components: the game engine, 
the source art library, and the MAP files. Id. at 1110. The MAP files, at issue in the case, 
contained the instructions that tell the game engine what to display in order to create the 
audiovisual display. Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1110. FormGen alleged that the audiovisual 
displays generated when a user plays the Micro Star game were derivative works because 
although the MAP files were not identical, the Micro Star version still used the Duke Nukem 
3D art library to generate the images. Id.
181 Id. at 1109.
182 Id. at 1110. The MAP files are what triggered the software to display certain 
audiovisual elements. Id.
183 Id. (emphasis added).
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issue could be derivative works because they triggered the various audiovisual 
displays and incorporated the underlying software.184
C. Fair Use in the Augmented Reality Context
While authors of original and fixed works are afforded general copyright 
protections, including the ability to control derivative works, the fair use 
doctrine is a limitation on the rights of copyright owners.185 Section 107 of the 
Act provides the courts with four factors to consider when determining whether 
something is fair use: purpose of use, nature of the copyrighted work, amount 
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole, and the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.186 An important focus of the first factor of the test is whether 
the use is “transformative.”187 The Supreme Court has stated that the more 
transformative the new work, the less significant the other factors will be.188
Each circuit uses this test as a general framework, although some have attempted 
to further clarify the fair use analysis resulting in a body of inconsistent case 
law.
In Cariou v. Prince, the Second Circuit found that an artist was entitled to 
fair use protections when he took photographs and altered them by painting 
different images over top of the subject’s facial features and using various sizes 
of the images.189 The court primarily focused on whether the artist had 
transformed the original artist’s paintings into something “new and 
different.”190 However, other circuits have disagreed with the Second Circuit’s
approach.191 As Judge Easterbrook has stated, “[T]he Second Circuit has run 
with the suggestion that transformative use is enough to bring a modified copy 
                                                                                                                     
184 Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1111–12 (9th Cir. 1998).
185 COHEN ET AL., supra note 150, at 563.
186 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, 
the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phono 
records or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), 
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use 
made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature 
or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the 
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; 
and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”).
187 COHEN ET AL., supra note 150, at 615.
188 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S 569, 579 (1994).
189 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706–08 (2d Cir. 2013).
190 Id. at 710 (“Prince used key portions of certain of Cariou’s photographs. In doing 
that, however, we determine that in twenty-five of his artworks, Prince transformed those 
photographs into something new and different and, as a result, this factor weighs heavily in 
Prince’s favor.”).
191 Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014).
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within the scope of § 107.”192 The Seventh Circuit has stated that holding that 
any “transformative use” could be a “fair use” would essentially blur the lines 
of where derivative works start and end, because to transform is to essentially 
create a derivative work.193 Further, the Seventh Circuit has stated that the most 
important of the four factors is generally the market effect.194
As demonstrated from these two cases,195 circuit courts are not uniform in 
their treatment of the fair use doctrine. Application of the fair use doctrine to 
AR in light of these decisions creates an uncertain scenario. First, AR 
applications are, by nature, highly “transformative.” An AR application could 
instantly overlay an unlimited amount of material on a user’s screen, making the 
underlying work unrecognizable. Second, AR applications are likely to utilize 
all of the underlying work when creating a new image, the second factor of the 
fair use test. Finally, treating the market effect factor as the most important, AR 
could have a dramatic effect on the market effect or long-range commercial 
opportunities of the author. Take the scenario at the beginning of this Part. If an 
artist had licensed her painting to a museum in 1990 before AR was 
contemplated, and that museum now provides its patrons with an AR application 
that allows them to digitally transform her painting at an additional cost, her 
long-range commercial opportunities may be substantially affected by the new 
AR application. From this brief overview, circuit courts would likely be 
inconsistent in their application of the current fair use doctrine to AR 
applications. 
D. A Framework for Amending the Copyright Act
Courts and scholars have been unclear on whether traditional mediums,
such as photographs, are derivative works or new original works. In fact, courts 
have correctly described the statutory language defining a derivative work as, 
“hopelessly overbroad.”196 Additionally, whether digital AR works will be 
protected by the fair use doctrine is unclear.197 Application of the various cases 
dealing with derivative works shows that it is likely that the federal circuits will 
be inconsistent in resolving even more complex AR cases. 
                                                                                                                     
192 Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (fair use provision). 
193 See Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 758 (“We’re skeptical of Cariou’s approach, because asking 
exclusively whether something is ‘transformative’ not only replaces the list in § 107 but also 
could override 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), which protects derivative works.”).
194 Id.
195 This Note does not delve further into the fair use doctrine because the only point 
needed is that fair use has not enjoyed straightforward application in the lower courts and it 
is highly unlikely that the courts will be uniform in their application of the current test to AR 
works.
196 Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1998) (elaborating that 
because the language is so overbroad, courts have had to develop doctrines to limit it, such 
as the requirements that the work exist in concrete or permanent form and must substantially 
incorporate the protected material from an existing work).
197 See supra notes 186–194 and accompanying text.
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Although shifts in medium alone have been found to be insufficient, using 
the reasoning from Ty, Inc., it is likely that courts will find AR creates derivative 
works.198 As the House Report accompanying the 1976 Act states, “the 
infringing work must incorporate a portion of the copyrighted work in some 
form. . . .”199 Any AR application will naturally recast and transform the 
original image, easily surpassing this standard.200 Additionally, application of 
the “nontrivial” standard utilized by Schrock will likely mean that AR 
applications will almost always be creating derivative works when new digital 
items are overlaid on top of real-world copyrighted objects.201
Similar to Micro Star, AR applications utilize the underlying work in order 
to create other works.202 For example, if an AR application only displays 
particular digital content when it recognizes an underlying original work, then 
like the MAP files in Micro Star, that underlying work is still a main component 
of the new digital work. In basic terms, without the underlying work, there 
would be no AR creation. Thus, a court applying the Micro Star reasoning 
would likely find that AR applications that utilize existing copyrighted works 
are creating derivative works.203
Whether the courts take the view that new AR applications are creating 
derivative works or new original works, there are a number of undesired results. 
As Paul Goldstein has stated, “taken together, sections 102(a) and 103, and 
sections 106(1) and 106(2), give a prospective copyright owner the incentive to 
make an original, underlying work, the exclusive right to make new, successive 
works incorporating expressive elements from the underlying work . . . .”204
                                                                                                                     
198 Unlike Ty, Inc., AR works “recast” the original work. See supra note 178 and 
accompanying text.
199 COHEN ET AL., supra note 150, at 333 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 62 (1976)). 
200 This is because AR by its nature utilizes the underlying work or landscape and 
“augments” it. This will always require displaying a copy of the original work on a device’s
screen.
201 In Schrock, the court quoted the Nimmer treatise to determine that the relevant 
standard is whether a derivative work contains a “nontrivial” variation from the preexisting 
work “sufficient to render the work distinguishable from the prior work in a meaningful 
manner. Applying that test to AR, it is likely that the digital transformations made to the 
underlying works will often result in substantial and nontrivial changes.” Schrock v. 
Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 520 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER 
& DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.01 3-2 (1978)).
202 Like the technology in Micro Star, an AR application will use the underlying code 
and the original protected work to display images on a device’s screen; however, the actual 
images being displayed on screen will likely change from user to user. See supra notes 180–
184 and accompanying text.
203 This is what makes AR technology especially tricky for copyright law. The amount 
of changes that are being made to an underlying work will never be consistent; they will vary 
from user to user. Thus, like the court in Microstar, a court will likely find that utilizing the 
underlying work results in a creation of a derivative work. See supra notes 180–184 and 
accompanying text.
204 COHEN ET AL., supra note 150, at 320 (citing Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and 
Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 209, 217 (1983)).
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Thus, if a court were to find that AR applications use the expressive elements 
of a work to create a derivative work, AR applications would constantly be 
infringing on copyrights unless they are protected by the fair use doctrine.205
Alternatively, if AR applications meet the originality threshold categorizing 
them as new, original works, which seems unlikely given the previous case law, 
then original owners would lose one of their basic incentives to create. AR 
application developers could create relatively simple software that substantially 
changed a copyrighted painting. Those application developers would then have 
a new work that they could copyright themselves. Obviously, this scenario 
seems highly unfair to the original author; however, under current law, this 
scenario is not unthinkable.206
Therefore, due to the inconsistent body of law dealing with derivative works 
and the application of the fair use doctrine, Congress must amend the Copyright 
Act to reflect the modern advent in ability to quickly create new derivative 
works that strikes the proper balance between original authors and developers. 
Congress has not been averse to amending copyright laws to consider 
technological advancements.207 For example, in 1976, Congress updated the 
Act to deal with the advent of computer software.208 Similarly, Congress must 
now act to refresh the Act to be effective in the current midst of the technological 
revolution. An effective update of derivative work and fair use protections 
would maintain the original author’s ability to control their original work, but 
also allow AR developers to continue innovating in the field. AR can be a 
powerful learning tool in places, such as museums; however, original authors 
must retain an incentive to create and must not lose commercial control of their 
works. 
Congress has also updated the Copyright Act to limit the exclusive rights of 
the copyright holder in the past. For example, section 112 of the Act was 
included in the 1976 Act to allow the transmission of certain works as long as 
                                                                                                                     
205 This is because the copyright owner has the exclusive right to control derivative 
works. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012). Reliance on the fair use doctrine by AR developers would 
be an uncertain defense and likely result in less innovation in the field. As stated, the fair use 
doctrine is inconsistently applied because of the four-part test. See supra Part V.C. Reliance 
on this test alone in the AR field is inadvisable because there is a clear separation between 
AR applications that use the underlying work for monetary gain and those that do not.
206 A court could rationally hold that an AR application created a new digital work with 
enough original elements to be independently copyrightable. This is due to the uncertain 
nature of precedent in the derivative work sphere. See supra notes 167–170 and 
accompanying text.
207 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 101 (1976); Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 
Pub. L. No. 105–304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in sections of 17 U.S.C. (2012 & Supp. 
IV 1999)); see also Legislative Developments, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, https://www.copyri
ght.gov/legislation/ [https://perma.cc/YEM6-7T2D] (listing fifteen recent legislative 
proposals to amend the Copyright Act in the 115th Congress, such as the Music 
Modernization Act of 2018).
208 See supra notes 150–151 and accompanying text (discussing the 1976 Act).
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no copies of the work were made.209 Section 112 can operate as a framework 
for how the legislature should handle AR. AR works are often benign in their 
usage and seek only to supplement the experience of the underlying original 
work.210 However, there are instances where AR could be a detriment to the 
copyright holder and cause the loss of monetary gains or the incentive to create 
new works.211
Thus, the new derivative work amendment should protect the original 
authors from AR applications attempting to monetize their works in a way that 
they did not originally intend. Conversely, AR applications should not be 
absolutely barred from utilizing any underlying works that may have copyright 
protections. Any amendment should utilize the fair use factor test to balance the 
interests of the original author and the subsequent uses of the work but also 
clearly distinguish between benign and monetary uses. 
Therefore, the Augmented Reality Derivative Work Amendment could 
read:212
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, and except in instances of 
contractual arrangement, it is not an infringement of copyright for an 
augmented reality (“AR”) application to utilize a work protected under section 
102 of the Act if –
The copy of the work is retained only within the software of the application for 
the purposes of digital overlay and no further copies are made or disseminated; 
and
                                                                                                                     
209 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 14, 101–02 (1976); COHEN ET AL., supra note 150, at 252 
(discussing how § 112(a) allows for an exception in certain cases where a “transmitting 
organization” can make one copy of a “transmission program” and not be liable for 
infringement).
210 For example, an AR application could use the underlying work for educational 
purposes only. When the application recognized a famous painting by Picasso, the 
application could augment a picture of Picasso, as well as historical and informational facts 
about his life. This is an example of a benign usage of AR.
211 In contrast, an AR application could recognize that same Picasso painting and allow 
the user to transform the image on the device’s screen using image editing tools. The user 
could then save the new creation to the device’s memory—for a fee. This usage of 
copyrighted works would be problematic because the AR developer is charging money and 
the user is able to save the altered work for further dissemination.
212 Of course, any amendment to the Act would need to cater more to the intricacies and 
nuances of copyright law and AR. Additionally, what was included under the term 
“augmented reality application” would need to be defined under Section 101 of the Act. Due 
to the limited space, the text proposed here is a mere starting point for lawmakers to identify 
and solve the issues that will arise as AR becomes more mainstream. The amendment has 
two main goals: (1) ensure that owners do not lose control over their works due to 
advancements in technology and (2) utilize the traditional fair use analysis to separate AR 
applications that are using original works for monetary purposes versus purely educational 
or supplemental means.
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The copy of the work is used solely for the purposes of overlaying new 
information within a determined service area and the use is within that 
originally contemplated by the copyright owner to be determined by the factors 
outlined in section 107 of this Act; and
The copy of the work is not used for the monetary or economic gain of the 
application developer unless otherwise provided by contractual arrangement.
The proposed text seeks to maintain the integrity and underlying goals of 
the Act while also allowing for reasonable innovation within the AR field. Thus, 
the example at the beginning of this Part would only be actionable as 
infringement if the AR application or the museum had started to exploit the 
underlying work and create new works for monetary gain, which would not have 
been contemplated by the original copyright owner.213 Alternatively, AR 
applications that merely added supplemental information to the underlying work 
would not be found to be infringing on the work.214 The proposed text attempts 
to utilize the existing fair use framework while also acknowledging that the 
current test by itself is not entirely suitable for AR applications.215
The amendment ensures that AR applications that utilize underlying 
copyrighted works are not liable for infringement as long as developers follow 
reasonable restrictions. Developers are free to create educational or 
supplemental applications, as long as the copyrighted work is not continuously 
copied or disseminated and sold for monetary gain, which is similar to the 
current way section 107 operates.216 If a developer does wish to utilize the 
underlying work for monetary gain or distribution, then that developer must 
obtain a license or permission from the copyright owner. In this sense, the 
proposed text brings the treatment of AR into the twenty-first century while still 
maintaining the underlying justifications and rationales of copyright 
protection.217
                                                                                                                     
213 An artist who placed their work in a museum would have expected that the public 
would view the work. However, it is unlikely that the artist would have imagined that a 
patron could walk into the museum with a paid AR application on their phone and augment 
new digital elements onto their work. The proposed text seeks to deal with this issue by 
separating monetary and non-monetary uses.
214 For example, if the museum or third-party developer only used the work in order to 
add supplemental information, such as facts from a site like Wikipedia, this would not be 
considered infringement, unless the application was using the underlying work for monetary 
gain without a contractual license with the author.
215 The fair use defense is often unclear in application. See supra Part V.C. Specifically, 
for AR, fair use presents a host of unforeseen issues due to the dynamic experience that 
changes from user to user and also the possibility that AR developers can use the underlying 
works for monetary gain in some instances and not in others. 
216 See supra note 186 and accompanying text for a discussion of the current fair use 
test. In this sense, the proposed text aims to maintain the author’s ability to make a profit of 
their works but also seeks to keep the integrity of the fair use test.
217 The proposed text seeks to allow the copyright holder to maintain their rights and 
incentives to create but also allow benign uses of their works as is expected under current 
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VI. CONCLUSION
The rapid development of new technologies in the midst of the current 
technological revolution is beginning to put a strain on both real and intellectual 
property laws. The time has come for comprehensive legislative action to avoid 
the gray areas that are certain to arise over the next five to ten years when the 
bounds of real and virtual worlds meet. As addressed in this Note, three areas of 
the law will be impacted in previously unforeseen ways by the forthcoming 
surge of AR development: real property law, trademark law, and copyright law. 
While the impacts will certainly be felt in the courts, Congress can take modest 
steps to alleviate the problems.
Enacting a new statute that provides real property owners with recourse 
against a virtual intrusion will place real property owners on an even playing 
field in an age where intellectual property can be placed in thousands of 
locations simultaneously. Likewise, updating the Lanham Act’s definition of 
actionable use to consider new technological capabilities of AR and mixed 
reality will prevent trademark holders from losing the value of their brand 
identifier while still allowing for AR applications to use trademarks for 
informational purposes. Finally, amending copyright law protections to clarify 
what constitutes an infringing use of an underlying work in the AR context will 
allow creators to retain the traditional incentives under copyright law while also 
allowing for innovation in the AR space. These measures will comprehensively 
protect innovation yet still provide incentives for the owners and creators of 
property. Additionally, these measures are more cost effective than relying on 
retroactive judge-made law to handle the issues and will provide much needed 
stability and clarity in the laws.
These approaches will allow the courts to adjudicate in an effective, 
informed manner and provide clear guidance to innovators in the AR field. 
Commercial AR is relatively new and rapidly growing as an industry, while 
current statutory law remains stagnant and silent on the issue. The current 
technological revolution is growing at a pace never before seen in human 
history. Thus, legal questions surrounding the new technology must be resolved 
with modest revisions to existing property laws before they become outdated
and ineffective.
                                                                                                                     
copyright laws. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 150, at 7 (“[C]opyright law provides a legal 
entitlement to the copyright owner to exclude others from enjoying certain benefits of the 
work. . . . Copyright law exists to prove a marketable right for the creators and distributors 
of copyrighted works, which in turn creates an incentive for production and dissemination 
of new works.”).
